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I.  The crisis of the Ruhr area and of the city of Dortmund 
 
1.Employment development and structural problems. 
 
The following figures and table A1 demonstrate what has been going on  in the Ruhr 
area in the last 30 years. An almost total structural transformation of the economy in 
this coal and steel region, formerly the largest in western Europe, has taken place. 
More than 500,000 jobs have been  lost in the two basic industries. 
 
Figure A1: Development of employment in the eight largest industrial branches 
in the conurbation of the Ruhr 1985-1995 
Source: KVR/DGB Ruhr-Memorandum, 1997,p 64 (Bade) 
Legend from above to below: electrical engineering, motorcars industries, food industries, chemical 
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Figure 2: The developement of employment in the Ruhr-conurbation 
´76-´98 – sectors of the economy
Mining
 
Source: Bömer, 2000c, 46 
 
The development of the sectors of business orient. services, household orient. 
services and also banking & insurance looks quite good in absolute terms, but in 
relation to the average standard of the (old) Federal Republic, and especially in 
relation to their large agglomerations, the performance of the economy of the Ruhr 
area is very weak, as figure 3 demonstrates. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that the capacity for generating employment in the production-
orientated services (including r&d) of the region has declined relative to the old 
FRG. Bade´s hypothesis (1998) is that in the last 20-30 years there has been a strong 
correlation between the number of business-orientated services and the development 
of jobs in the processing industries and the other service sectors. This is the so-called 
parallel thesis. Because science-based industries are traditionally located in other 
regions, for example, in Munich or Düsseldorf, and because it is not possible to 
reproduce such an environment in every old industrial area in the space of two or 
three decades, this parallel thesis seems to make a good contribution to explaining 
the weakness of the Ruhr economy. Although the public part of innovation policy in 
the Ruhr area seems to be in some cases a success, the number of innovation-
orientated jobs in private business is not large enough in comparison with other 
regions in Germany (see Figure 3). As the whole, therefore, the process of job 
creation in the Ruhr has, in comparison with other German metropolitan areas, not 
been very successful (Figure 4). 
 
Results: a decline of the basic and other industries, an under-proportional growth of 
new industries and services,  high employment rates (see Table 1) and a financial 
crisis in the local communities and the budget of the federal state of Northrhine 
Westfalia. 
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Figure 3: The relative development of employment in the Ruhr-
conurbation ´76-´98 – sectors of the economy
Mining 
Alteration in comparison to the national standard (old FRG)
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Figure 4: The development of employed persons (Erwerbstätige) in 








Source: Bömer, 2000c,47 
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1970  1980  1985  1990  1992  1995  2000 
A) Population in 
1,000. 
5.599,5 5.396,1 5.192,4 5.396,2 5.443,5 5.440,5 5.359,2 
Migration balance  15,352 5,752  -5,563 65,459 32,746  7,946  -7,037 
Share of 
immigrants in % 
 8.2 7.9 9.7  10.4  11.0  11.1 
B) Unemployed  
people 
(September) 
12,500 104,232 268,709 231,616 222,280 269,735 279,415 
Unemployment 
















Source: Kommunalverband Ruhrgebiet (Hg.) Städte- und Kreisstatistik Ruhrgebiet, 
different years; Bömer, 2000 b, 41 
 
2.Policies in the last three decades: defensive and offensive regional strategies 
 
Defensive strategy: socially controlled decline and modernisation of both basic 
industries (Bömer, 2000b, chapter 2 and 4; Bömer, 2001, chapter 2). 
Offensive policies:  five new universities, new infrastructure in the field of 
education, transport and housing (ibidem), intensive inward investment activities.  
Since the 80
s the phase of launching new clusters, like the software complex in the 
city of Dortmund or the logistics complex in Duisburg, has begun. This approach has 
been intensified since the mid 1990
s when it became clear that the decline of the coal 
mining industry was accelerating and the concentration of the steel industry was 
generating a new wave of rationalisation . Without reducing the steel production in 
the Ruhr area the Thyssen-Krupp company closed the steelworks in Dortmund in the 
year 2001, whereas in 1979 about 25,000 steelworkers earned their money in these 
works. 
 
Today the Ruhr area is a semi-de-industrialised region, and the different parts of this 
area have very different economic and structural profiles (see figures 5 and 6, 
appendix). The city of Dortmund was very successful in generating a strong high 
tech complex , especially a 12,000 job software cluster. After the 1997 decision to 
close the steelworks in Dortmund a public private partnership of the city of 
Dortmund, the Thyssen Krupp company, the state government of Northrhine 
Westfalia, the chamber of industry and commerce and the trade unions launched the 
so-called Dortmund-project as a specific local, economic development approach to 
push  the economy of the city forward and to decouple the development in Dortmund 
away from the ongoing general decline of the region (see chapter II). McKinsey 
designed the project, although years ago some similar proposals had been made by 
the trade unions and some consulting firms which designed these basic lines for the 
economic development department of the city of Dortmund (Arbeitnehmerfraktion, 
1997). 
 
Figure 5 (see appendix) indicates that the former industrial heart of Germany, the 
Ruhr area, nowadays is a very low-industrialised region in NRW. Figure 6 (see 
appendix) demonstrates the different economic structures of the different parts and 
cities of the Ruhr area. 
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Looking at these differences it seems to be understandable that some local groups 
and politicians  are trying to get away from the decline trends of the common 
regional tanker Ruhr, just as the city of Dortmund  is trying to do.     
 




In the year 2000 the city of Dortmund launched the so-called dortmund-project as an 
answer to the 1997 decision of the steel company Thyssen-Krupp to close steelworks 
in 2001 that had had about 25,000 employees at the end of the 70s. Thyssen-Krupp 
initiated and partly financed a consulting report and consulting process by McKinsey 
to develop a strategy for creating new jobs (mostly at the old steel sites) to 
compensate for the losses in the old basic industries. In cooperation with the local 
department of economic and employment development (WBF, Wirtschafts- und 
Beschäftigungsförderung) the following vision was presented. 
 
The dortmund project and its six main goals (dortmund-project, 2000, 5) 
 
1. To set up new anchor industries in Dortmund (information technology (IT), e-
commerce, micro-systems engineering and e-logistics), shortly: A Major Centre of 
Germany´s New Economy  
2. To strengthen companies already sited in Dortmund 
3. To expand training and skills upgrading programs and promote R&D, thus 
meeting international standards 
4. To turn the City of Dortmund into a modern business metropolis with a high living 
standard and unrivalled leisure-time facilities 
5. To expedite planning and approvals procedures: one-stop shopping for start-ups 
and incoming companies 
6. To substantially boost employment (70,000 new jobs –60,000in the new anchor 
industries; see Table 2)
1. 
 
On the level of the Ruhr area the state government of NRW has called for a reduction 
in the unemployment rate by about 50% by the year 2006, the last year of the 
Objective-2 funds of the EU. Again this aim is very ambitious and seems to be a 
voluntarist cry and appeal to solve the problems without funding the necessary 




Main instruments of promoting the anchor industries are  
1. the construction of incubator centres for IT and e-commerce (software-/e-factory), 
micro-systems engineering (MST factory), e-logistics (e-port), robotics and 
biomedical technology,  
                                                 
1  This calculation is not based on much experiences in writing regional economic development 
programmes. The multiplicator between additional jobs in the export basis industries and those ones 
depending on the regional domestic demand is much higher than 7 to 6. The generation of additional 
70,000 jobs needs maximum 35,000 in new anchor industries.  
 
   8 
2. higher education activities in these sectors (E/IT Academy, expansion of the 
existing departments in the universities, a campaign at the high schools of the region 
to increase student intake), 
3. start-up promotion via start-up competitions, business angel programs and venture 
capital companies, 
4. creating a specialised business community in the new sectors by organising 
associations, networks and events. 
 
Advanced studies of the clusters and dimensions of  the “New Economy” and its 
regional impact in the eastern part of the Ruhr show very clearly that the city of 
Dortmund is a very important location for these clusters, that nearly all conditions of 
research and higher education for this sector are located in this city and that the local 
politicians and the business world are very conscious of this opportunity to develop 
these new anchor industries (see Arbeitnehmerfraktion im KVR, 1997; DGB 
Dortmund, 1999, Bömer, 2000 b, Roland Berger, 2001).  
 
Table 2: Employed people in the city of Dortmund in the years 1970, 2000 and 2010 
 
 1970  2000  2010  (forecast**) 













logistics); 10,000 in 
existing companies 
All sectors  277,000  225,000  295,000 
*MST: microstructure technology (incl. nanotech.); ** forecast by McKinsey, the 
official project managers of the Dortmund project and the local mayor  
Source: Stadt Dortmund, 2001, page 4  
 
 





1.  The stages of the cycle: boom and contraction 
 
The hype of the new economy speculation wave finished in March 2000. Key players 
of this poorly defined sector are the telecom companies which use the products of the 
network suppliers (like Cisco, Nokia and Siemens etc) and mobile phone producers 
(Nokia, Ericson, Siemens etc) and the software suppliers (Microsoft, Norton, SAP, 
Materna). Another key group – partly the same as the first group - is the internet 
providers, their software-producers and web-designers. In my paper “The regional 
impact of the „hostile“ takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone on the Rhine-Ruhr 
Region” (Bömer, 2000a) I described the mechanisms of  speculation in the field of 
                                                 
2 For a wide theoretical and empirical treatment of this theme from a political economy point of view 
see Bischoff, 2001.   9 
mobile phoning at the end of 1999 and the first months of the year 2000 by looking 
at the Vodafone-Mannesmann takeover (see below). 
The third group of important actors in this fundamental boom and crash have been 
the banks, especially the investment banks, the ánalysts´, the media people who 
generated the public feeling of endless success and also the national state 
governments who got large incomes by privatising their telecom companies and 
selling licences for the UMTS-generation of mobile phones. It seems to be important 
to note that economists and commentators believe that equity prices have remained 
until today (May 2002) “extremely high” (Financial Times, 18
th of May, page 6). 
Also the UMTS engagements are very risky (see Table 4). 
 




























in bill. Euro  
15,1 12,3 11,2 3,2  0,6  (4)  12,8 3,6 
Profits/losses 
in bill. Euro 
-3,5 -8,6 -12,9  -0,5  no 
inform. 
+2,1 -7,5 
              
1: year 2000; 2: business year 2000/01 (new figures are not available); 4: estimated 
for 2001/02 
Source: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.5.02, page 22 (Judith Raupp) 
 
Three weeks after the publication of this table  Deutsch Telekom published a loss of 
4,7 bill. Euro for 2001 at its AGM and forecast a 6 bill. loss for 2002. Vodafone 
announced a 21.3 bill. Euro (!) loss before taxes. (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 29./30.5.02, 
p. 28), the largest loss in the economic history of Great Britain. Also the UMTS-
future of this sector does not look very confident. 
 
 
Table 4  The start-up list for UMTS 
 





T-Mobil July  2002 
(D1) 
9,500 23,1  2003 Deutsche 
Telekom 
Vodafone   D2June 
1992 
9,000 21,8  autumn 
2002 
Vodafone 
e-plus  May 1994  4,200   7,5  2003  KPN Mobile 
77.5% 
Royal KPN   10 
22,.% 












3,900   3,7  mid 2003  mmO2 
(earlier British 
Telecom) 





* At the end of 2001, because Mobilcom and Quam do not own their own networks, 
their customers are included in the number of the other suppliers. 
** The structure of owners will change and therefore also the UMTS-timetable. 
***Mid of April 2002 
Source: Die Zeit nr. 21, 16th of May 2002, page 23; authors translation 
 
In my Brno paper I wrote: 
 
“Overpricing and overspeculation 
 
In my view nobody is able to demonstrate seriously that such prices ( which have 
been paid for company mergers on the mobile phone market) will make it possible to 
earn money in the future, even if it is recognised that they partly financed the 
takeovers with their own money, namely their shares. One reason is that the prices 
for phoning have become very low, that the products of telecommunication services 
are very homogenous and that in such markets even an oligopolistic market structure 
does not guarantee over-proportional profits. The share rate–profit ratio (Kurs-
Gewinn-Verhältnis (KGV)) has become extremely high in the “new economy”. 
Satiated markets will be seen even in the mobile telephone market in the next two or 
three years, although the next generation of mobile telephones based on the UMTS-
standard will expand the turnover of this sector – but in a very unknown dimension  -
whereas the costs of obtaining a licence and investing in the new infrastructure are 
extremely high. But if you ignore these basic issues and only follow the internal logic 
of the game of a stock exchange boom in combination with a classical founder´s 
boom…, you may also find some of the present arguments for playing this game.  
 
The logic of the process of centralising this market requires the bosses of these firms 
to make their own corporations valuable (schwer) in terms of total stock market 
prices….The share rate-profit ratio of Mannesmann was 347.99 on 23rd December 
1999 in comparison to about 11 for Volkswagen and other classical blue chips! One 
explanation is that in exploding new markets not turnovers and profits determine the 
exchange rates but the EBITDA, the Earnings Before Interests, Taxes, 
Deterioration and (Goodwill-) Amortisation. Indeed this key figure has risen 
dramatically in the last years. Corporate daring is rewarded and is reflected in 
this indicator (Honoriert wird dann unternehmerisches “Draufgängertum”). But at 
the end of the day the share rate – profit ratio will again dominate the share pricing at 
the stock exchanges. And no one can be really sure whether corporations like 
Vodafone (or Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom etc.) will be able to earn money in 
the future, because they have high debts (see below) which have been accumulated in 
the last year and will increase by 2001” (Bömer, 2000a, 10f)   11 
 
Because the door to financing any more debts by the emission of shares in the year 
2001 closed the telecom companies launched huge capital market bonds for which 
they had to pay interest. Deutsche Telekom, for example, has a debt volume of about 
67 bill. Euros. They also tried to sell all their activities and property assets which 
were not part of their key- activities. But sometimes this escape route seemed to be 
closed, because – look for example at the television-cable activities of the Deutsche 
Telekom - the media-industries and companies themselves are in the midst of a crisis 
(ish in NRW, Kirch Media, digital television in Britain, Vivendi in France and so 
on).  In the early summer of 2002 Deutsche Telekom (DTAG) again tried to launch a 
jumbo bonds emission of about  8 bill Euros for which they had to pay about an eight 
percent interest rate. This rate is very high, because the WorldCom crisis is also 
affecting DTAG and the other companies like France Telecom, British Telecom and 
Sonera who all are supposed to emit  similar jumbo bonds in the year 2002. 
 
What could be a solution to this situation? 
 
Normally some companies have to go bankrupt. The US-company WorldCom and 
maybe the German-French-Mobilcom could be the first candidates to go bankrupt. 
But some of the telecom companies are still partly owned by the states (Deutsche 
Telekom: 43%, France Telecom). In any case they are national champions who at 
least in the past were, at the end of the day, protected and helped by the national 
states. So it seems to take more time to destroy the over-accumulated capital in this 
sector. That means that the real investments in this sector will continue to remain on 
a very low level. The telecom companies will not pay taxes on profits for many 
years. This deepens the financial crisis of the Federal State of Northrhine-Westfalia
3 
and  the cities where some of the headquarters are located (Bonn, Düsseldorf). 
Beside the investments that are necessary for establishing the minimum UMTS-
infrastructure they reduce their investments radically. So the network providers and 
producers also have lower turnovers.  
 
Summary: the crisis in the main parts of the new economy is deeper than discussed in 
the public. So the investments remain low, and it is much more difficult than it 
seemed to be two years ago to take this sector of the economy as the most important 
one for tackling regional and local economic crisis, as was done in the Ruhr area and 
especially in the city of Dortmund. 
 
 
IV.  First results of the dortmund project and perspectives of the economic and 
financial status of the area and the city of Dortmund 
 
1. First results of the Dortmund project (at the end of 2001, see dortmund-project 
(Hg.)(2002)): 
 
-  Important steps have been taken to found the main institutional and physical 
infrastructure of the Dortmund project: incubators like the e-logistic centre, 
the biomed-centre, the B1st Software Factory  and the Centre for 
Microsystems  Technologies have been started or launched. 
-  The main sites for the future high technology activities of firms have been 
developed successfully (Stadtkrone Ost ) or are in the starting phase 
                                                 
3 Within two years the net debts of the state of NRW grew by 8,1 bill. Euro from 79,5 to 87,6 bill. 
Euro (SZ, 14.6.02, 41).   12 
(Phoenix-West). All these important preconditions for a successful 
development of these new economy activities have been accepted by the state 
government of NRW. The key elements of the dortmund-project  are part of 
the list of the most important cluster activities which are supported and 
supposed to be subsidised by the state government and the EU in the years 
2002-2006 (Projekt Ruhr, 2002).  
-  Also the activities to strengthen human capital in the IT sector have been 
successful: three start-up competitions have been realised. The ITC, a school 
for a two year  course for IT professionals, is in its second year, the number 
of students in informatics has grown significantly; 300 experts are voluntary 
consultants  and business angels for start-ups. 
-  In Dortmund the total number of the employees fell from 194,684 in 1998 to 
190,223 in 1999, but rose again to 197,214 in the year 2000- The number of 
unemployed people has been reduced from 41,001 in 1998 to 36,188 in 2001 
(30.6.). 
-  The number of jobs  and firms () in the IT industry (mainly software industry) 
grew from 9,650 (440) in 1999 to 12,200 (645) in 2001; in the microstructure 
technology industry from 950 to 1281 and  in the logistics industry from 
about 12,000 to 13,000. 
 
But it should not be forgotten that these results happened mainly in the years of the 
hype and the initial crisis of the new economy, and that rates of growth like 30% 
between 1999 and 2001 in the IT sector are part of the past and will not appear again 
in the future. So the aim of 60,000 jobs in the anchor industries seems to be a very 
voluntarist provision (Bömer, 2000b, 11). Finally all main indicators of the general 
strength of the economy of the city of Dortmund have not become fundamentally 
better than in the past.  
 
Some aspects of the accelerating crisis in Dortmund: 
 
-  Materna, the largest independent software house in Dortmund, decided to 
cancel the new construction of the headquarters office block at Stadtkrone 
Ost, a 100 mill. Euro investment. Also the 45,.000 square meters Europa-
Center investment at this site is has not left the pipeline. (The 2001 turnover 
of office space has been about 25,000 square meters (Wirtschafts- und 
Beschäftigungsförderung Dortmund, Immobilienmarkt Dortmund 2002). 
-  The state government of Northrhine Westfalia decided to launch a huge 1.4 
bill. Euro budget expenditure cut in the year 2003 because of the fast growing 
budget deficits. 
-  The city of Dortmund budget deficit has exploded from a balanced budget in 
the years 1999 and 2000 to the following figures: 
 
Table 5 Prospected budget volumes (without investments) and deficits of the city 
of Dortmund (2002-2007) in Euro  
Year  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Expenditures 
(bill. Euro) 
1.471 1.535 1.630 1.652 1.659 1.663 
Deficit 
(mill.Euro) 
  116,8    189,2    253,6    261,9    269,7    258,8 
Deficit in % 
of the budget 
   7.9     11.8     15.6     15.9     16.3     15.6 
Source: Stadt Dortmund, Drucksache 02683-02, 3.5.02.    13 
(These budget provisions contain the general reduction of expenditures of 10 
mill. in 2003, 20 mill. in 2004 and 30 mill. in 2005) 
 
Also on the national and regional level the new perspective of the financial status 
is nothing but depressing: 
 
-  To prevent the so-called “blue letter” from Brussels which deals with the 
Maastricht criteria problem of the 3 percent budget deficit limit in the year 
2002  the German minister of finance agreed to launch a nearly balanced 
budget until the year 2004. For achieving this very ambitious – and in terms 
of economic growth extremely contra-productive -  macroeconomic decision 
(see Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik, 2002, 42-61) in the spring 
of 2002 an agreement between the central government, the Länder and the 
associations of the cities, local communities  and counties was made, which is 
called “stability pact between the federal, state and local governments”. This 
“pact” limits expenditures and deficits of all three levels of the German 
public administrations and governments. Because of the very low growth rate 
of the GDP which is expected for 2002 (0.7%; 2001: 0,6%) and the next 
years public assistance for a fast expansion of the new economy sector will be 
reduced substantially. 
-  The costs of the flagship-projects like the Metrorapid (the name of the 
Transrapid, a new high speed magnetic train system between Düsseldorf and 
Dortmund, which is calculated with about 3.5 bill. Euro) -  or 3-DO (a huge 
shopping-mall above the Dortmund main station which costs about 600 mill. 
Euro and needs about 135 mill. Euro grants from the state government) are 
growing fast. As long as the state and local governments continue to promote 
these projects there will be much less money for supporting the key areas of 
the economic development strategy, like the new technology centres, 
education and training and so on. 
 
2. Does the city of Dortmund have a chance to move away from the negative trends 
of the Ruhr area? 
 
It seems to be clear that after the decline of the coal mining industry and the 
concentration of the highly productive steel industry in the western part of the area 
(Duisburg) the different parts of the former coal and steel region have become very 
different in terms of economic structure. Figures 5 and 6 (appendix) present the so-
called “regional profile index” which describes the differences of the shares of seven 
sectors of the economy between the average level of the land NRW and the cities and 
counties of the Ruhr area (Nordhause-Janz, 2002, p. 5 and 7). Also a new study of 
the RWI which deals with the commuter relations of the employees shows very 
clearly that the Ruhr area has lost its homogeneity – if it ever existed – in terms of 
the economic structure and strength (Schrumpf, 2001). But beneath the common 
heritage of the spatial results of the mining and steel industry und the settlements 
structure two very homogeneous factors exist which determine the economic strength 
of each part of the whole region: at first the rates of de-industrialisation (see figure 6, 
appendix) and unemployment are very high in all parts of this area, and secondly the 
financial situation of all cities is serious. So the different parts in terms of branches  
and structures have different perspectives – but all of them are negative in 
comparison with other agglomerations and neighbourhood regions, as figure 5 
(appendix)  shows clearly. 
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Tab. 6: Forecast of employed persons in the local labour markets of the conurbation 
Ruhr and the regions around 1997 - 2004 
 
Labour-market  Employed persons  Forecast 2004  Forecast 2004 
  (in 1000)  share FRG  Employed people 





          
Duisburg 457,9  415,9      -5.8  391,8 
Essen 321,5  305,0      -0.9  302,6 
Gelsenkirchen 417,0  383,5      -3.5  370,1 
Bochum 173,0  163,2      -1.5  160,8 
Dortmund  490,2  450,8      -1.9  442,2 
Hagen 96,4  85,4      -7.2  79,3 
Total 1,956,0  1,803,8      -3.2  1.746,1 
Regions around           
Düsseldorf 777,0  740,1      0.7  745,3 
Wuppertal 242,9  211,3      -3.1  204,7 
Schwelm 137,0  123,4      -2.4  120,4 
Kleve 101,7  101,0      3.0  104,0 
Münster 330,7  342,3      3.6  354,6 
Borken 143,4  147,3      6.0  156,1 
Steinfurt 166,5  161,0      2.4  164,9 
Lüdenscheid 213,9  195,6     1.1  197,8 
Soest 120,9  123,2      2.4  126,2 
Total 2,234,0  2,145,2      1.4  2,175,2 
Source: Bömer, 2000 b, page 85; F.J. Bade (1999): Regionale Entwicklung der 
Erwerbstätigkeit 1997 – 2004. Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung, Heft 4/1999, Nürnberg;  
*author´s calculation; assumption: GDP-growth is as large as the growth of 
productivity; this means that the number of employed people in the FRG will be 
constant. 
 
Dortmund has a much better perspective than Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen and Hagen. 
But in absolute terms it is still negative and also in relative terms in comparison with 
the neighbouring regions like Münster; Lüdenscheid and Soest. 
 
Also a new special analysis of the University of Dortmund about the past and the 
provided future of the economic structure and activity levels of the city of Dortmund 
(Bade et al., 2002) describes very clearly that ceteris paribus the city of Dortmund 
will not be able to compensate the deep negative effects of the regional crisis by 
means of its own activities, although its economic development strategy is very 
ambitious and managed in a professional way (see chapter II). 
From 1976 to 2000 in the city of Dortmund the number of the employed persons was 
reduced by 13.5%. Only in the years 1985-1991 and in the year 2000 did the amount 
of employed people grow. In the region Dortmund, Unna, Hamm, which includes the 
main sub-urbanisation  areas of the city of Dortmund, this number fell by about 3% 
(Bade 2002, 9; see figure 7, appendix). The development of the employed people in 
Dortmund in comparison to selected large cities (Bade, 2002, 9) and the relative 
development of employed people in Dortmund in comparison to the development of   15 
the old FRG have been very negative (Bade et al., 2002, 12; see figure 8, appendix). 
Dortmund lost 23.8% of its share of employed people (Duisburg 35.4%) whereas all 
centres of the agglomeration areas lost only 9.1% and the cities of Nürnberg 3.4%, 
Mannheim 8.3%, Stuttgart 9.3% und Cologne 10.7%. Also the productivity (gross 
value added per employee) in comparison to the average development of the former 
FRG fell by about 20%. In absolute terms the productivity of the jobs in Dortmund 
grew by 72% from 1976 until the year 2000, whereas the FRG (old) grew by 
117.2%.  
The sectoral structure of the city and the region is also very problematic because the 
share of the processing industry is only 13.4% (17.2% in the region) in comparison 
to the agglomeration centres (17.3) and agglomeration regions (21.9%) and the 
Federal Republic (24.5%). These data signal a large step towards a situation of de-
industrialisation. Business- orientated services which normally expand very fast need 
the processing industry as a pole of demand. Cities with the best performance, like 
Munich or Stuttgart, do have a strong industry and a strong services sector (sectoral 
parallelity hypothesis) .  
The Dortmund share of advanced services (financial sector, insurance, legal and 
economic consultancy, technical consulting, real estate and other business orientated 
services (marketing, advertising etc)) runs mostly at the average of Germany, 
although large cities and centres of the first category (Oberzentren) normally have an 
over-proportional share. 
Also the shift-share analysis shows very significantly that the structure of the 
economy does not explain the over-proportional amount of losses in the processing 
industries and the under-proportional gain of jobs in the main sectors of the services 
industries. So the so-called location factor, which is a statistical garbage can, is very 
important. If all sectors of the economy of the city of Dortmund had developed like 
the sectors in Germany (old) at all between 1976 and 2000, Dortmund should have 
gained 17.000 jobs or 7.6%, the region of Dortmund about 15.000 or 3.8%. But in 
real terms Dortmund lost about 35.000 jobs, the region 36.000 (Bade et al., 2002).   
 
 
V. Modernisation as a necessary  but not sufficient condition for solving the crisis: 
An outline of  an alternative macroeconomic and social-ecological strategy 
 
 
The main result of  my investigation seems to be that modernisation strategies in the 
sense of  cluster policies  and the approach of M. Porter and his diamond are a 
necessary  but not sufficient condition for solving the crisis of large, old 
industrialised regions like the Ruhr or East Germany. So the interregional policies for 
strengthening the regions in crisis have to be improved. This improvement  has to be 
discussed in two parts. First on the macroeconomic level and secondly on the level of 
national state and European regional policies. 
 
1. A comparison between the policies of the Euroland (European Central Bank and 
the Eurogroup within the EU) and the UK monetary and fiscal policies in the nineties 
may open our eyes to some important differences in the monetary and fiscal policies 
which affect the general level of economic activity and employment (Arestis/Sawyer, 
2002; Priewe 2002; European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in 
Europe, 2001): In the 90s the UK approach was much more Keynesian-orientated 
and therefore expansive than the continental one, which was very stupidly fixed on 
low inflation rates and low budget deficits, resulting in the large countries of the 
continental EU in much lower growth rates of the GDP and therefore in lower   16 
employment rates. These macroeconomic influences cannot be compensated even by 
very good structural policies of the regions and the Länder. 
 
2. The example of Merseyside and Liverpool shows that in an environment of 
expansive macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policies huge regional funds (EU-
objective-1 funds) are able to stop or even slow down the decline of regions with 
severe problems. 
 
Table 6  Merseyside and the Hinterland Region (Forecast Summary) 
 
  1996 2000 1998 2001  2002*  2004* 
GDP(%p.a.)  1.1 3.3 3.9 2.8 2.9 3.2 
-Manufact.  -0.8 4.9 5.7 3.5 3.7 4.4 
-Services  2.1 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Employment   1098,7 1175,3 1127,8 1256,7 1273,5 1306,8 
-Manufact.    206,7 224,7 212,9 237,6 242,0 248,8 
-Services  892,0 950,6 914,8  1021,1  1031,5  1058,0 
Unemploym.  128,2 78,1 89,3 70,1 69,9 66,1 
Working 
Pop. 
1226,9 1253,4 1217,2 1329,3 1343,4  1372,  9 
Unempl. 
Rate (%) 
10.5  6.2 7.3 5.3 5.2 4.8 
Real Wage 
(% p.a.) 
0.7  2.7 1.9 2.5 1.8 1.6 
Source: Minford, Patrick and Stoney, Peter (2001/2002): Liverpool Research Group 
in Macroeconomics No.1/July 2001 and No.2/March 2002; * forecast  
  
But, of course, this table does not tell us anything about the partly very poor quality 
of these jobs and the working poor problem.  
 
3. An outline of  an alternative social-ecological strategy 
 
It is not possible to explain by purely regional factors the enormous rise in 
unemployment that took place in the Ruhr area between the end of the 1970s and the 
mid-1980s and which continued in the 1990s (a rise of 5,7% by 1980, 14,2% by 1985 
and 11,3% by April 2002). The social and economic history of a region cannot be 
analysed without references to international and national history and policies. At the 
beginning of the 1980s a severe cyclical crisis occurred in all the industrial countries 
of the Western world. Furthermore, a rapid change in macro-economic policies, from 
Keynesian demand-side policy to neo-liberal supply-side and monetarist policies, 
took place.  
 
An alternative macro-economic strategy agrees with the parallel thesis of regional 
economists described in chapter 1, but argues also explicitly that at the European and 
EU-member-state level an alternative expansionist macro-economic employment 
policy and a general reduction of working-time are the main preconditions for 
combating regional crises (European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy 
in Europe, 1997, 2001). An analysis of disparities in income and unemployment 
shows that in periods of general growth the level and the deviation in unemployment 
rates between the regions and the member states of the EU declines, whereas in 
periods of economic crisis and stagnation these disparities increase (European 
Commission, 2001). Because of the necessities of sustainable development, the   17 
expansive public investments and expenditures have to be concentrated in ecological, 
educational and social fields (Bömer, 2000b, chapter 5 and 6). These policies have to 
be implemented and accompanied by a substantial financial redistribution in favour 
of the regions in crisis. A modern, cluster-orientated regional and local economic 
strategy, as has been realised by the city of Dortmund and state government of NRW, 
is necessary, but by no means sufficient. 
To criticise the unrealistic aspects of the new visions of the dortmund-project and the 
Projekt Ruhr (2000) is, of course, to walk a tight-rope because I do not want to 







Arbeitsgruppe Alternative Wirtschaftspolitik (2002): Memorandum 2002. Blauer 
Brief für falsche Wirtschaftspolitik – Kurswechsel für Arbeit und Gerechtigkeit. 
Köln 
 
Arbeitnehmerfraktion in der Verbandsversammlung des Kommunalverbandes 
Ruhrgebiet, Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, Landesbezirk NRW (1997): 
Ruhr-Memorandum 1997. Zur Lage und Perspektiven der Ruhrwirtschaft. 
Bearbeitung: ISA-Consult. Bochum / Essen 
 
Arestis, Philip/Sawyer, Malcom (2002): Geldpolitik im Eurosystem und Alternativen 
der Vollbeschäftigung. In:  WSI Mitteilungen. Monatszeitschrift des Wirtschafts- 
und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts in der Hans Böckler Stiftung, Heft 05/2002 
 
Bade, F.-J. / Niebuhr, A. (1998): Zur Stabilität des räumlichen Strukturwandels. 
Institut für Raumplanung, Fakultät Raumplanung (Hg.):  Arbeitspapier 158. 
Universität Dortmund. Auch erschienen in: Jahrbuch für Regionalwissenschaft. 1999 
 
Bade, F.-J. (1999): Regionale Entwicklung der Erwerbstätigkeit 1997-2004. in: 
Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung, Heft 4/1999. Nürnberg 
 
Bade, Franz-Josef et. al. (2002): Wissensintensive Dienstleistungen in Dortmund. 
Unpublished paper, Dortmund 
 
Bischoff, Joachim (2001): Mythen der New Economy. Zur politischen Ökonomie der 
Wissensgesellschaft. Hamburg 
 
Bömer, Hermann (2000 a): The regional impact of the „hostile“ takeover of 
Mannesmann by Vodafone on the Rhine-Ruhr Region – a new paradigm for 
stakeholders in/ from traditional industrial regions in Germany? Revised Paper 
presented to the XIV AESOP-Congress at Brno, Czech Republic 18.-23.7.2000 
 
Bömer, Hermann (2000 b): Ruhrgebietspolitik in der Krise. Kontroverse Konzepte 
aus Wirtschaft, Politik, Wissenschaft und Verbänden. Dortmunder Beiträge zur 
Raumplanung Bd. 101. Dortmund 
 
Bömer, Hermann (2000 c): Changing Economy and the Evolution of Economic 
Development Policies in the Ruhr 1978-1998: What are the Perspectives and   18 
Different Concepts under the new Conditions of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU)? In: Chris Couch & Hermann Boemer (eds) (2000): Economic restructuring, 
urban changes and environmental policy in the Ruhr and Merseyside, 1978-1998. A 
Report of Two Colloquia held at Dortmund University & Liverpool John Moores 
University during 1998 
 
Bömer, Hermann (2001): New economy and new projects in old industrial areas – do 
they slow down the trend of decline? The case of the Ruhr area and the City of 
Dortmund. Paper (final version) presented to the First World Planning Schools 




dortmund-project (ed)  (2000): The new perspective for Dortmund: A Major Center 
of Germany´s  New Economy. Dortmund. See www.dortmund-project.de 
 
 
dortmund-project (Hg.) (2002): Jahresbericht 2001. Dortmund 
 
European Commission (2001) Unity, solidarity, diversity for Europe, its people and 
its territory. Second report on Economic and social Cohesion. Brussels  
 
European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe (1997): Full 
Employment, Social Cohesion and Equity in Europe. Alternatives to Competitive 
Austerity. A declaration and memorandum of European economists. Barcelona, 
Bremen, London, Paris. See http://www.epoc.uni-bremen.de  
 
European Economists for an Alternative Economic Policy in Europe (2001): 
Economic Policy against Recession and Polarisation in Europe ! Proposals to 
overcome ideological sterility and policy blockades. See http://www.epoc.uni-
bremen.de  
 
Minford, Patrick and Stoney, Peter (2001): Grounds for Optimism. In: Liverpool 
Research Group in Macroeconomics (2001): Merseyside Business Prospect 
No.1/July 2001  
 
Minford, Patrick and Stoney (2002): Merseyside can catch up with the rest. In: 
Liverpool Research Group in Macroeconomics (2001): Merseyside Business 
Prospect No.2/March 2002   
 
Nordhause-Janz, Jürgen (2002): Das industrielle Herz schlägt nicht mehr im 
Ruhrgebiet. Veränderungen der Beschäftigtenstrukturen in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
IAT-Report 2002-03. See http://iat-info.iatge.de/iat-report/2002/report2002-03.pdf  
 
Priewe, Jan (2002) Fiskalpolitik in der Europäischen Währungsunion – im Dilemma 
zwischen Konsolidierung und Stabilisierung. In: WSI Mitteilungen.  
Monatszeitschrift des Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts in der Hans 
Böckler Stiftung, Heft 05/2002 
 
 
Projekt Ruhr (2002): Kommunale Entwicklungsschwerpunkte Ruhr. Positivliste, o.O. 
(Essen ), 6.3.2002. See also: Project Ruhr GmbH (o.J.(2002)): Ruhr local authority 
selective development plans, o.O. (Essen) 
   19 
Raupp, Judith (2002): Schlechte Nachrichten und alle büßen. Aktionäre über 
Kursrutsch verärgert. „Psychologische Übertreibung nach unten". In: Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 10.5.02, page 22 
 
Roland Berger (2001) (Hrsg: Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand, Energie und 
Verkehr des Landes NRW): Kompetenzfelder für das Ruhrgebiet. Düsseldorf  
 
Schrumpf, Heinz (2001): Gibt’s es noch ein Ruhrgebiet? Essen. Rheinisch- 
Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
 
Stadt Dortmund  (2001) :dortmund project (Phase II- Umsetzung-
2.Sachstandsbericht), Drucksache Nr. 01052-01 
 
Wirtschafts- und Beschäftigungsförderung Dortmund (Hrsg.) (2002): 















































Table A1: Trend of employment in selected sectors/ Ruhr 1976-1998 
(the 66 statistical structure) 












Energy and  
water 
30.192 30.362 29.526 30.356 31.074 30.807 28.508 -5,6 +4,7 
Coal mining 
 
160.588 138.359 122.323 100.777 89.206 74.622 55.151  -65,7 -63,3 
Chemical  
industries 
44.685 44.745 42.772 45.009 41.353 36.735 20.789  -53,5 -17,6 
Iron and  
Steel 
132.430  114.015 80.468 68.410 65.029 51.110 38.970  -70,6 -66,9 
Steel forming 
industry 
22.758 23.424 23.532 23.721 23.408 19.802 18.827  -17,3 +9,8 
Structural  
steel work 
26.514 29.041 26.762 26.985 25.042 21.410 16.844  -36,5 -5,9 
Mechanical  
engineering 
78.433 71.859 61.910 59.280 58.660 48.022 41.549  -47,0 -15,4 
Motorcars  
industry 
37.268 39.395 35.862 39.138 40.208 34.630 34.452 -7,6 +16,2 
Electrical  
engineering 
48.972 46.603 44.499 50.164 51.419 44.660 40.997  -16,3 -13,1 
EBM- 
products 
15.854 16.506 13.372 14.096 12.537 10.692  9.800  -38,2 -5,1 
Food 
industry 
31.549 31.445 30.679 31.441 31.786 29.360 23.592  -25,2 -4,4 
Construction  
industry 
105.851 97.841 75.622 72.582 76.417 74.091 59.606  -43,7 -26,4 
Interior 
works 
44.273 44.736 40.909 42.238 45.044 43.946 41.808 -5,6 +16,9 
Wholesale 
trade 
77.424 77.480 70.624 78.683 85.048 83.378 77.150 -0,4 +16,0 
Retailing 
 
158.139 152.826 136.420 142.885 150.380 144.097 133.345 -15,7 +11,8 
Credit banks 
 
26.126 28.489 31.039 31.449 32.467 32.841 31.489  +20,5 +33,7 
Education 
 
37.240 45.198 43.929 47.805 49.569 49.711 54.014  +45,0 +62,1 
Hotels/ 
restaurants 
26.994 30.664 34.621 43.547 48.532 51.508 57.429  +112,7 +90,6 
Health  
services 
63.366 75.308 82.810 94.985 103.735 109.878 111.360  +75,7 +83,0 
Building  
cleaning 
15.407 15.332 16.711 22.060 27.079 27.234 29.894  +94,0 +127,6 
Private non- 
profit org. 
19.786 22.127 29.247 35.570 38.313 41.115 47.063  +137,9 +117,8 
Public  
institutions. 
61.198 61.893 62.885 68.363 68.751 67.442 60.026 -1,9 -3,1 




Figure 5 Employees in the regions of Northrhine Westfalia (NRW) – regional profile index
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Figure 5: Employees in the regions of NorthrhineWestfalia (NRW) – regional profile index  1998, basis: overall 
NRW
 
Source: Nordhause-Janz, Jürgen (2002), page 5; authors translation 
 
                                                 
4 The profile index compares the employment shares of each sector of a region with the shares in the whole region (basic region). Some mathematical operations limit the figures 
between –100 and +100. Positive figures indicate that the employment structure o f a region in comparison to the basic region (NRW) is more affected  by the analysed sector. 
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The Ruhr area is no
homogeneous economic 
Figure 6 Employees in the employment agency districts of the Ruhr area – regional profile index 1998; basis: overall 
NRW





Figure 7  The development of employed persons in the city of Dortmund in comparison to selected cities 1976-2000 
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Figure 8  The development of employed persons in the city of Dortmund in comparison to selected cities 1976-2000 – 
alteration in comparison to the national standard (old FRG) 1976 = 100 
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